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ABSTRACT 
Internet of things (IoT) devices are becoming ubiquitous in, and even essential to, 
many aspects of day-to-day life, from fitness trackers, pacemakers, to industrial control 
systems. On a larger scale, live stream of sleep patterns data recorded via fitness tracker 
devices was utilized to quantify the effect of a seismic activity on sleep. While the benefits 
of IoT are undeniable, IoT ecosystem comes with its own set of system vulnerabilities that 
include malicious actors manipulating the flow of information to and from the IoT devices, 
which can lead to the capture of sensitive data and loss of data privacy. My thesis explores 
a Privacy-Preserving ECG based Active Authentication (PPEA2) scheme that is 
deployable on power-limited wearable systems to counter these vulnerabilities. 
Electrocardiogram (ECG) is a record of the electrical activity of the heart, and it 
has been shown to be unique for every person. This work leverages that idea to design a 
feature extraction followed by an authentication scheme based on the extracted features. 
The proposed scheme preserves the privacy of the extracted features by employing a light-
weight secure computation approach based on secure weighted hamming distance 
computation from an oblivious transfer. It computes a joint set between two participating 
entities without revealing the keys to either of them. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Generalizations in IoT 
The world is going through a dramatic transformation, rapidly moving from 
isolated systems to internet-enabled ‘things’ which connect to a shared infrastructure and 
work in harmony with other devices. This new communication paradigm has shown 
tremendous potential in enriching everyday life, increase business productivity and 
efficiency of many processes. In this internet of things or IoT [1], all kinds of devices 
connected to the network irrespective of their computational capabilities and can be 
broadly segregated into three layers, Device Server, Smart Devices and the End Devices. 
Figure 1.1 Device layers in IoT 
Following this three-tier classification, represented in figure 1.1, is an IoT 
application in the healthcare domain, the Wireless Body Sensor Network (WBSN) [2,3] 
or Body Area Network (BAN). WBSN/BAN is a network of embedded or wearable 
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physiological sensors that stream data on the users’ health into a sink, typically a 
smartphone for processing. Physiological sensors for ECG, EEG, blood pressure, 
temperature and motion sensors, etc. continuously monitor the user in real-time. This 
stream of data allows for quicker diagnostics, comprehensive patient history, monitor 
fitness objectives, etc. 
Figure 1.2 Wireless Body Sensor Network Architecture. Reprinted from Wikimedia 
Commons [4] 
Figure 1.2 shows a typical architecture of a WBSN. The sensors here on the 
person are the end devices connected to the smartphone a smart device which is 
connected to the cloud the device server. 
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1.2 Security objectives and challenges 
The nature of data flowing through a WBSN is sensitive and private as it contains 
crucial information about the user's health and physical state. Regardless of the sensitivity 
of the data, due to the potential benefits, more and more people are getting comfortable 
with the idea. There is no denying the benefits of WBSNs or other wireless sensor 
networks, but as is the nature of wireless communication it is easy for an adversary to alter 
the transmitted messages or inject malicious data into the message stream. This intrusion 
could be fatal especially in the case of WBSNs where the data is sensitive to the user's 
health and physical state. 
In the literature, there are two proposed solution to this problem cryptography and 
authentication [5]. By using cryptographic primitives, the messages could be encrypted by 
the sender and decrypted by the receiver using a shared key. However, traditional public 
key cryptography requires storage and processing of significant number certificates which 
impractical in the sensor networks due to the constrained power and computational 
resources. Also, cryptographic techniques have inherent key management problem which 
deals with generating and sharing of the keys. The problem is exacerbated by low power 
and headless nature of these devices. 
1.3 Authentication 
Authentication is establishing and verifying the identity of an individual. It is 
applicable wherever it is required to prevent unauthorized access to information, physical 
locations, etc. With the advent of the communication paradigm IoT, where devices are 
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communicating with other devices, and more sensitive data online a secure authentication 
scheme is essential. Typically, an individual's identity can be established by a unique 
pattern of behavioral or physiological characteristics. A behavioral trait used for 
identification of a person is unique but has to be consistent and repeatable like a signature, 
a pattern of dots, password. On the other hand, there are physiological traits also known 
as biometric data like facial features, fingerprints, iris scan ECG, etc. can also be used for 
identification. In a typical authentication protocol, the server uses the information from 
the client to compare one or more of these traits to the pre-registered set which validates 
the identity. 
Traditional authentication methods rely on numerical or graphical passwords 
which are vulnerable to surfing attacks. With a weak password, an attacker can get access 
via a line-of-sight from a short distance, social engineering, phishing, etc. The user could 
also either forget or share the password as well. Masdari et al. study a potential list of 
possible security attacks against authentication schemes in body sensor networks [6]. 
Biometric authentication is more reliable than their credential based counterpart. A 
biometric system requires a physiological or behavioral characteristic of the user which is 
unique and universal [7]. Fingerprint and iris are examples of such physiological features 
whereas gait and speech are behavioral Unlike the credential based method, a biometric 
feature cannot be forgotten or shared and depending on the kind of signal used cannot be 
duplicated either. 
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1.4 Related work 
There has been a considerable amount of research in the wearable medical sensors 
space [8]. These sensors can pick up all kinds of physiological signals like beats per 
minute, perspiration, EEG, ECG, perspiration, motion, etc. Since the mid-2000s 
authentication in sensor networks has been an active research area. In 2006 Luk et al. 
proposed a list of security requirements for an ideal sensor network [9]. They showed that 
most authentication techniques at that time met only a subset of those requirements. 
In [7] Wayman et al. show security benefits of a biometric authentication system 
and following the improvements in sensor technology it has become possible to 
authenticate users even in a sensor network biometrically. In 2002 the Fuzzy vault scheme 
was proposed by Jules and Sudan et al. [10]. In this scheme, the biometric feature vector 
is projected into polynomial which is created using a shared key. These projected values 
are mixed with random chaff points and then sent to the receiver. The receiver recreates 
those projected values using its key and the feature template, and if it has enough overlap 
with the set of values received from the source, then the authentication is successful. As 
the sender does not send its features values in the channel, this scheme preserves the 
privacy of the biometric features. In [11] Karthik et al. show the implementation of this 
fuzzy vault technique with fingerprints. 
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CHAPTER II 
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 
2.1 Introduction 
Biometric authentication is authentication using biometric data. It involves a 
biometric data capture system and an authentication protocol which matches the captured 
biometric data to a pre-registered template. There are two types of biometric features 
physiological and behavioral. Physiological features, as the name suggests are internal 
features and not in control of the user like the fingerprint and iris patterns. Voice and gait 
are examples of behavioral features. Physiological features provide better reliability and 
stronger security as they are not in control of the user and do not change significantly over 
time. Behavioral features are more susceptible to spoofing attacks. 
 There are a lot of human identification methods proposed in the literature. 
Physiological features like face, eyes, fingerprints-palm and behavioral features like voice, 
gait [12-15], have been successfully shown to identify a person from a group. These 
systems are based on quantifiable features unique to every person and do not change over 
time. The method of feature extraction varies from one method to the other depending on 
the input type and in the computation requirement, and the reliability is measured by the 
false acceptance rate (FAR), true acceptance rate (TAR) [16]. 
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2.2 ECG vs. other biometrics 
[17] The electrocardiogram(ECG) is a record of the electrical activity of the human 
heart. It is typically used extensively for diagnosing irregularities in the heart. Research 
from the last decade suggests that it is unique for everyone and could be used for 
identification. The uniqueness of ECG makes diagnosis a challenge but is an advantage 
for biometric authentication systems. An ECG based system has a distinct advantage over 
other physiological features, and that is it's an internal signal. There have been ways to 
copy a fingerprint, iris pattern of a person as they are both external signals but the ECG 
signal cannot be reproduced, and unless the health of the person is compromised it doesn't 
change. It has inherent liveness, real-time properties so it cannot be used if the user is 
deceased. Other advantages of using ECG is the cost of the sensor is cheaper compared to 
the previously mentioned methods. 
Figure 2.1 The human heart. Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons [18] 
Figure 2.1 shows chambers of the heart, the right and left atrium and the right and 
left ventricles. A group of cells initiates a heartbeat in the right atrium called the sinoatrial 
node (SA node). SA node is the natural pacemaker of the heart initiates an electrical 
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disturbance results in alternating contraction and relaxation of the heart muscles, the 
myocytes. 
Figure 2.2 Typical ECG wave representing a cardiac cycle. Reprinted from Wikimedia 
Commons [19] 
Figure 2.2 shows a typical ECG trace of a normal heartbeat. It is a one-dimensional 
time-varying signal. The electrical disturbance starts at the sinoatrial node (SA Node), the 
natural pacemaker and then radiates outwards causing the myocytes to depolarize and 
compress rapidly. Specific segments of the plot represent a different phase of the cardiac 
cycle as mentioned below: - 
• P-wave: represent atrial depolarization. It precedes the QRS complex.
• PR-interval: represent the time taken for electrical activity to move
between the atria and ventricles. 
• QRS-complex: represents depolarization of the ventricles.
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• ST segment: represents the time between depolarization and repolarization
of the ventricles (i.e., contraction). 
• T-wave: represents ventricular repolarization. It follows the QRS complex
Figure 2.3 ECG collection leads. Reprinted from Wikimedia Commons [20] 
In clinical diagnostics, ECG is collected from 12 leads from a combination of ten 
electrodes as listed below. Figure 2.3 shows the placement of all the leads. 
• Lead I: right arm – left arm
• Lead II: right arm – left leg
• Lead III: left arm – left leg
• aVR lead: right arm
• aVL lead: left arm
• aVF lead: left leg
• V1 – V6: chest leads
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The twelve leads help the diagnostician to look at the electrical conduction system 
of the user from different vantage points. In the last decade, ECG signals have shown 
potential as a physiological feature in this identification problem. The earliest work by 
Biel et al. [21] was using temporal, amplitude, and slope features from the ECG for 
identification. Israel et al. [22] proposed identification using only temporal features and 
claimed that the temporal characteristics are agnostic of the anxiety of the individual. A 
similar claim by Janani et al. [23] using a combination of accelerometer and ECG signals 
to identify people in different physical states. The above-mentioned work also indicates 
that ECG from a single lead has all the physiological parameters for it to be unique and 
we don’t need all the twelve leads for identification purposes. 
The fingerprint is the oldest and most prevalent form of biometric authentication 
used. It is an exterior characteristic, and it is possible for an adversary to capture and replay 
it for authentication resulting in a false positive. This biometric signal is also susceptible 
to damage resulting in false negatives. The article in [24] demonstrates the vulnerability 
of commercial cell phones using fingerprint-based authentication. Another approach to 
preserving the privacy of is cryptography. The sensors would transmit encrypted data, and 
the network edge would decrypt using a shared secret key. This method works for a user-
facing system it is not ideal sensor networks due to the crucial inherent agreement, and in 
the event of a breach, the system remains vulnerable unless the key is changed. Due to the 
resource limitation on the sensors we cannot use stronger encryption techniques. 
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2.3 ECG based authentication challenges 
Unlike other biometric sources, ECG signal or features extracted from the ECG 
signal contains very sensitive data to the user's health. As proposed in [22, 23] the 
extracted temporal features from the ECG signal are a function of the morphology of the 
heart. Transmitting raw features over a wireless network is a potential vulnerability. An 
adversary could gain access to the features and reverse engineer the information about the 
physical well-being of the user. The adversary could also intercept the message and add 
unwanted and malicious code into the data stream. This is also dangerous as the altered 
message could lead to faulty diagnostic information. This calls for an authentication 
mechanism which hides these features in some way without losing the potential benefits 
of identification. 
2.4 Related work 
Since it has been shown that ECG could be used to identify people in a group, there 
has been a bunch of work done to use that idea in the context of wearable sensor networks. 
In 2016, Falconi et al. proposed the idea of using extracted ECG features to authenticate 
in mobile devices [25]. In 2012, Zhang et al. proposed an algorithm based on the fuzzy 
vault scheme but without the key distribution overhead [26]. In [27-32] different feature 
extraction methods are considered for ECG based authentication. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECG BASED IDENTIFICATION 
3.1 Overview 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it has been shown that the normalized 
temporal distance between the fiducial points in a cardiac cycle remains consistent for an 
individual and are independent of the anxiety state. Since the fiducial points indicate the 
beginning, the end and the peak of an electrical activity the temporal distance between 
them is a function of the heart's physiology and is independent of heart rate. This distance 
remains constant in a developed human heart and does not change over time. A set of 
features are calculated from the ECG wave, and then that is used for authentication. 
Based on the feature extraction techniques in the above-mentioned works they can 
be grouped as fiducial point based techniques. Identification by ECG can be classified into 
two categories fiducial point and non-fiducial point based [29]. In the fiducial point based 
method, fiducial points (P, Q, R, S, T) are identified in the ECG signal, and the features 
are extracted from those [7,8]. In the non-fiducial point based approach the feature vector 
is extracted from a signal segment. Plataniotis et al. [30] use the coefficients from a 
discrete cosine transform of an autocorrelated signal segment as the feature set. Another 
approach by Yarong et al. [31] uses coefficients from a Fourier transform for their feature 
set. Tantawi et al. [32] proposed a method for using discrete wavelet transform. The R-R 
signal segment is processed using the discrete bi-orthogonal wavelet, and the non-
informative coefficients are removed to reduce the feature set size. 
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3.2 Feature Extraction 
Figure 3.1 Taxonomy of feature extraction 
Feature extraction in ECG can be categorized into two broad categories, fiducial 
point based and non-fiducial point based. In the fiducial point method, the fiducial points 
P, Q, R, S, T, etc. of the wave are identified, and then authentication features are extracted 
from these points. The features could be the temporal distance between two fiducial points, 
a difference in amplitude or angle of the wave between two fiducial points. The non-
fiducial point method does not require identification of any points on the wave instead 
they take the coefficients of a signal transform or a neural network as the authentication 
features. Figure 3.1 shows the taxonomy of feature extraction in ECG based identification. 
Figure 3.2 Feature Extraction steps 
The feature extraction process can be split into four steps. Signal, Pre-Processing, 
Annotation, Extraction. Figure 3.2 gives a diagrammatical representation of the steps. 
Feature 
Extraction 
Fiducial point 
Time 
Non-Fiducial point 
Amplitude 
Angle 
Phase 
Frequency 
Pre-
Process 
Annotation Signal Features 
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Signal: This simulates the ECG wave from a person. It accumulates the signal over 
a period of three seconds and passes it to the next block for processing. Specifically, three 
seconds is chosen such that at least one complete cardiac cycle is recorded. The ECG 
signal is read from a file. Figure 3.3 below shows a stream of raw ECG signal sampled at 
500Hz. 
Figure 3.3 Raw ECG wave 
Pre-Process: This step is done to facilitate accurate feature extraction from the 
ECG wave. The figure showing the raw signal shows a noisy version of the actual signal. 
It has both high and low-frequency components. The primary source of the high-frequency 
noise is the 50Hz or 60Hz power to which the ECG collection system is connected. The 
low frequency is probably due to the variation in the baseline voltage of the contacts. We 
remove these noise components using a bandpass filter. This step increases the efficiency 
of the following annotation step adding robustness to the design. 
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Figure 3.4 Filtered ECG wave 
Figure 3.4 shows the filtered ECG signal along with the with the raw signal 
overlay. Both the high frequency and the low-frequency noise components are 
significantly reduced. 
Annotation: In this step, the fiducial points in the signal are identified. Continuous 
wavelet transform and fast wavelet transform are used for identifying the fiducial points. 
The annotation is done in two phases, in the first phase the high frequency QRS complex. 
The QRS complex is the representation of ventricular contraction, and it is distinctively 
high as the contraction of the ventricles requires the highest energy. In the second phase, 
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the low-frequency P and T waves are identified between the R-R intervals extracted from 
the first phase. 
Figure 3.5 Amplified QRS 
QRS detection [33]: A continuous wavelet transform is applied 13Hz with an 
inverse wavelet. The resultant spectrum is filtered again to remove any frequency 
component below 30 Hz. This amplifies the QRS complex removes all the low-frequency 
components. 
𝑆(𝑎, 𝑏) =
1
√𝑎
∫ 𝑥(𝑡)Ψ∗ (
𝑡 − 𝑏
𝑎
) 𝑑𝑡
+∞
−∞
 
Where Ψ∗ is the complex conjugate of the inverse wavelet function, and 𝑎
dilation parameter and 𝑏 the location of the wavelet. This operation amplifies the QRS 
complex and attenuates the P and the T wave. As shown in figure 3.5  
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After CWT, we perform a fast wavelet transform (FWT) is used remove all the 
frequency components below 30 Hz by making all the corresponding coefficients zero. 
Another round of filtration leaves us with a signal which only has the QRS complex. The 
diagram below shows the transformations and the result for a sample ECG wave. 
Figure 3.6 QRS identification result 
Figure 3.6 shows the reconstructed signal from the filtration. It has non-zero values 
at the location of QRS complex and zeroes everywhere else. 
P and T wave detection: After calculating the positions of the QRS signal the signal 
is segmented between R-R intervals. An R-R interval has precisely one T wave for the 
depolarization of the ventricles followed by a single P wave for the polarization and 
depolarization of the atriums. A transformation using CWT with a 3Hz inverse wavelet 
gives a spectrum with min and max values corresponding to the T wave boundary. The 
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peak is then identified as the highest voltage between this limit. Similarly, a transformation 
using 9Hz inverse wavelet identifies the P wave.  
Now that we have the locations of the Q, R, S points on the signal. The next stage 
is the detection of the T wave. Considering the most extended possible duration of the T 
wave, it can be analyzed by CWT at the 3 Hz frequency. The peak of the T wave is shown 
as zero in the CWT spectrum, and the min and max values correspond to the beginning 
and end respectively. A similar thing is done to extract the P waves at 9Hz. The following 
figure shows the original signal with all the labels. Figure 3.7 shows all the annotated 
points on the filtered signal for sour subjects. 
Features: The feature extraction process for both fiducial point based and non-
fiducial point based methods is same till the QRS detection. In the non-fiducial point-
based features we need to isolate individual cardiac cycles. The following section gives 
details about the features extracted in both scenarios. 
19 
Figure 3.7   Annotation results
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3.3 Fiducial points based vs. non-fiducial point-based features 
Israel et al. [22] showed successful identification using a set of 15 temporal 
features. They proposed that the temporal distance between fiducial points, as shown in 
figure 3.8 below, is the time it takes for the ions to move from one place to the other 
(atriums to ventricles or vice versa).  The time taken by the ions to move inversely 
proportional to the distance which ultimately makes the temporal features a function of 
the physiological properties of the heart. A significant advantage of this approach is the 
extracted features are agnostic of the mental state of the person. 
Figure 3.8 Identified fiducial points on the ECG 
Following the above-mentioned method, the number the following features are 
extracted: 
1. R-Q
2. S-R
3. R-P2
4. R-P1
5. R-P3
6. T2-R
7. T1-R
8. T3-R
9. P3-P1
10. T3-T1
11. T2-S
12. Q-P2
13. T2-P2
14. Q-P1
15. T3-S
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All the fifteen values are non-negative and are normalized by dividing each value by 
the length of the entire beat T3-P1 and clamped to a 16-bit value. The normalization 
steps also make the features independent of the heartbeat as shown in [22]. This set of 15 
16-bit values constitute the feature vector for an individual. 
Figure 3.9 Parallel coordinates plot of feature templates from six individuals 
The mean feature vector extracted from six different individuals is shown as a 
parallel coordinate plot in figure 3.9. Since none of the lines overlap, it shows that these 
feature vectors could be used as for identifying a specific person. 
For the non-fiducial point-based approach, we need to isolate individual cardiac 
cycles from the original signal. As the signal contains repetition of the cardiac cycle 
isolating them improves the feature extraction. Any cardiac cycle starts with the P wave 
followed by the QRS complex and at the end the T wave. Straightforward partitioning of 
the signal between the start of P wave and at the end of the T wave results in a set of 
samples that vary in length.  A linear interpolation of these isolated beats leads to too much 
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variation in the wave. To resolve this problem, we center the isolated wave around R by 
taking the maximum of the difference between T3R and RP1 and taking that many samples 
around R. As the QRS complex is the most distinct portion of the heartbeat this approach 
generates fixed size signal template consistent for an individual. 
Figure 3.10 Non-fiducial point based feature template for six people. 
Figure 3.10 shows the translated individual beats for six individuals. The beat in 
downsampled to a vector of size 100 and as evident from the plot the wave of a cardiac 
cycle does not change for an individual, and it is unique. In the following section, we 
analyze the consistency and the uniqueness of these features using histogram plots.  This 
vector of size 100 is used as a feature vector.  
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3.4 Analysis 
For an accurate authentication or identification, we want the features from the 
same individual to be as consistent as possible and as different as possible from others. 
Figure 3.11 Histogram plot of pairwise distance between the features of the same 
individual for six people. 
Figure 3.12 Histogram plot done between the feature template of different people. 
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The mean normalized Euclidean distance between features from the same 
individual is between 0 and 0.2 calculated for 40 people. Figure 3.11 shows a histogram 
plot of the first four subjects. The same distance among the feature templates of 30 people 
was found between 0.6 and 1.0 as shown in figure 3.12. Although more samples will result 
in a better analysis this group of 40 people shows that the extracted features are unique 
and consistent enough for an authentication system. 
Although the non-fiducial based approach is less computationally intensive, it 
generates a lot more features. The excess number of features translates to more number of 
messages in the authentication, and more messages come at the increased cost of power. 
The following chapter presents an authentication protocol based on a privacy-preserving 
set intersection protocol by Amar et al. [34]. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
4.1 Introduction 
This section presents the next half of the work in which the extracted features from 
ECG are used to authenticate the user. In the context of IoT, a Body Area Network (BAN) 
is a wireless network of wearable devices or physiological sensors.  BANs have been 
proposed to provide real-time health information for the user through wearable or 
embedded sensors. They offer quicker diagnostics, granular health information by tracking 
movements, sleep patterns, eating habits, etc. In 2015, Gia, Tuan Nguyen, et al. propose 
the idea of fog computing in healthcare systems [35]. The idea is that the data collected 
by BAN's gets processed by a network edge, typically a smartphone for processing the 
data and to the cloud for synchronization. The middle tier devices like the smartphone are 
not as resource constrained as they used to be, hence having them process the stream of 
data from the sensors would result in faster results and reduced the load on the cloud. 
In 2016, Yeh et al. introduce a secure IoT based health care system which operates 
through BSN (Body Sensor Network) architecture [36]. The proposed system is designed 
to work with public communication infrastructure and uses robust crypto-primitives to 
ensure transmission confidentiality and entity authentication of devices in all three layers 
of the device stack. It is pointed out that the security approach must be IoT specific for 
optimal performance as the existing security measures work best for high-level traffic 
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through the internet. Ex. Firewalls were containing management control protocols which 
do not work for end devices. 
Luk et al. [9] propose a list of seven desired seven properties in a network broadcast 
authentication. It is also claimed that none of the existing network broadcast authentication 
strategies has all seven of these fundamental properties. 
1. Resilience against node compromise: Isolating a compromised node. One of the
solutions is Asymmetric authentication. 
2. Low computation overhead: Since we are dealing with sensor nodes, typically they
are computationally constrained. The authentication scheme has to be aware of this. 
3. Low communication overhead: This talks about the sensor nodes being power
constrained as radio signals consume a lot of power and an authentication scheme with 
very high MAC would become impractical. 
4. Robustness to packet loss: This is a network problem which could also be the work
of an attacker. The man in the middle attack. 
5. Immediate authentication: Some sensor network applications require instant validity
as it may contain critical information which should not be delayed. This is an application 
constraint.  
6. Messages sent at irregular times
7. High message entropy.
In the following sections, an authentication mechanism is demonstrated which satisfies 
all the criteria. 
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4.2 Privacy-preserving set intersection protocol 
Privacy-preserving set intersection protocols are algorithms that involve two 
systems holding a set of inputs and want to compute a set intersection of their inputs 
without revealing the inputs to each other. Consider a two people 𝐴, 𝐵 each having 𝑋, 𝑌 
amount of money respectively. They want to know who is more prosperous but don't want 
to reveal their net worth. To do this calculation, they would have to use privacy preserving 
operation on their private values and obtain the result for themselves. These algorithms 
are based on the work done by Yao [37] for secure computations on data sets.  
Oblivious transfer (OT) is cryptographic primitive where a sender sends one out 
of many inputs to the receiver but remains oblivious as to which inputs are transferred. A 
more practical flavor OT is the 1-2 oblivious transfer proposed by Even et al. in [38]. In 
this method, the sender sends two values to the receiver each with a probability of ½ of 
transferring. 
Amar et al. [34] proposed a set intersection protocol that enables two agents to 
jointly compute the Hamming distance between their keys without revealing the actual 
keys, the distributed set intersection protocol. The protocol utilizes secure hamming 
distance computation from oblivious transfer to compute a joint set between two system’s 
input datasets of length 𝑛. The proposed protocol achieves full security in the semi-honest 
model and preserves the privacy of the input data set. The approach combines hamming 
distance and oblivious transfer technique. 
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4.3 Proposed algorithm 
Figure 4.1 Distributed Set Intersection flow. 
In this section, the algorithm for authentication is described as shown in figure 4.1. 
Let’s consider two entities 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆 for receiver and sender respectively where the sender 
gets the ECG signal and extracts the feature vector in real-time. The receiver 𝑅 has a 
feature vector of 𝑚-bit values, and size n, Y= [𝑦1, 𝑦2. . 𝑦𝑛]  and the sender has extracts a 
feature vector of similar dimensions X= [𝑥1, 𝑥2. . 𝑥𝑛]. We want to calculate how similar 
is X to Y without revealing any part of X to the receiver and Y to the sender and the result 
of that computation tells us if the sender is the valid user or not. 
The algorithm in [34] outputs a hamming distance between X and Y. Hamming 
distance between two vectors only gives the information about the number of bit-positions 
the value is different between them. A difference in the bit value of the most significant 
bit (MSB) or least significant bit (LSB) has no consequence on the result. This would 
suffice when we try to match exact vectors, but as ECG is a real-time, the feature values 
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remain close to each other but never the same. This results in a not so ideal scenario of 
lower false negatives and higher true negatives hence that algorithm cannot be used as it 
is. The following paragraph shows the modification which returns a weighted Hamming 
distance measurement. 
The algorithm has three phases, in the first phase the sender S generates a set R 
with 𝑛 ∗ 𝑚, 𝑚-bit random values such that 
𝑅 = [[𝑟11, 𝑟12. . 𝑟1𝑚], [𝑟21, 𝑟22. . 𝑟2𝑚]. . [𝑟𝑛1, 𝑟𝑛2. . 𝑟𝑛𝑚]]
and the key RK is calculated by 
𝑅𝐾 = ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Next step is garbling the bits of X into two matrices the R0 and R1 such that 
𝑅0 = {𝑅:  ∀𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝑅,  𝑟𝑖𝑗 = (𝑟𝑖𝑗 +  (𝑥𝑖 𝐴𝑁𝐷 (1 ≪  𝑗 − 1)))} 
𝑅1 = {𝑅:  ∀𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝑅,  𝑟𝑖𝑗 = (𝑟𝑖𝑗 +  (𝑥?̅? 𝐴𝑁𝐷 (1 ≪  𝑗 − 1)))} 
Where 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], and 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑚]. The sender sends these garbled values to the 
receiver followed by the RK and the first phase of the protocol concludes. The original 
protocol only adds the bit 𝑥𝑖 to the LSB position of 𝑟𝑖𝑗  and does not consider the 
significance of the bits. In the second phase of the algorithm, the receiver on receiving R0 
and R1 calculates a 𝑅𝐾
′  by: 
𝑅𝐾
′ = ∑ ∑ {
𝑅0𝑖𝑗 ⊕ 𝑦𝑖  𝐴𝑁𝐷 (1 ≪  𝑗 − 1),   𝑖𝑓  0 = (𝑦𝑖 𝐴𝑁𝐷 (1 ≪  𝑗 − 1))
𝑅1𝑖𝑗 ⊕ 𝑦𝑖 𝐴𝑁𝐷 (1 ≪  𝑗 − 1),    𝑖𝑓 1 = (𝑦𝑖 𝐴𝑁𝐷 (1 ≪  𝑗 − 1))
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
This step essentially calculates (𝑟𝑖𝑗 + (𝑦𝑖𝑗 ⨁ 𝑥𝑖𝑗)), where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖𝑗 are 𝑗
th position
bits of the 𝑖th value in the set Y and X respectively. If the bits are same, the correct random 
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value gets added else an increased value corresponding to the significance of the bit is 
added to key 𝑅𝐾
′ . 
The last phase of the protocol is a simple step of comparing the key to the 
calculated key at the receiver. If the difference of between them is less than a certain 
threshold, then the sender is genuine.  
𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ = {
1, (𝑅𝐾
′ − 𝑅𝐾 < 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ) 
0,  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
The receiver can authenticate the sender without any actual exchange of keys. In 
the following sections, we experiment with ECG data from 40 different individuals and 
find the ideal threshold to get the highest accuracy. A comparison of the accuracy using 
the original protocol is also presented. 
4.4 Security analysis 
In this section, we analyze how the proposed algorithm measures up to the list of 
requirements of a sensor network authentication. 
1. Resilience: The authentication is not based on any key hence if a node is
compromised it does not affect the other nodes. 
2. Low computation overhead: The complexity if the algorithm is O(n) where n
is the number of bits of the feature vector. The most demanding step is the 
calculation of the garbled data (R0, R1). 
3. Low communication overhead: The message complexity is also similar to the
time complexity of the algorithm and is linearly dependent on the number of 
bits in the feature vector. 
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4. Robustness to packet loss: Although packet loss in phase 2 of the algorithm
would lead to a false rejection the low computation overhead of the system 
allows for a restart again. This in conjunction with a real-time ECG signal 
makes the authentication robust to packet loss. 
5. Immediate authentication: Once the algorithm concludes the results are valid
for the next set of features arrive from the ECG feature extraction module. The 
algorithm does not have any delay modules and would be able to authenticate 
as soon as it receives all the messages. The only part where delay could be 
introduced is the communication channel. 
6. Message sent at irregular times: If all the messages arrive at the receiver the
receiver should be able to run the authentication algorithm. The order of 
messages does not matter. 
7. High message entropy: For every authentication cycle the ender calculates a
new set R and the values from ECG are never the same as well. This increases 
the entropy of the messages in the system. 
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CHAPTER V 
 SIMULATION 
5.1 Overview 
Figure 5.1 Overview of the simulation 
In this section, the simulation is described for testing the proposed feature 
extraction techniques and the authentication protocol. Figure 5.1 shows the flow of 
information from sensors to the smart device. The ECG data is read from a file and 
partitioned into 3 sec worth of samples. From an empirical constant of the min bpm 20 
beats per minute, a 3 sec ECG wave will have at least one cardiac cycle. This three second 
of the signal is then filtered and passed to a feature extractor module which extracts the 
feature vector and initiated the communication protocol. The garbled data is transmitted 
the to the receiver with a message id. The message id and the key remain valid the next 
three seconds. If the receiver computed key is received back from the receiver, and the 
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weighted hamming distance is less than the threshold, then the receiver is authenticated. 
Otherwise, the authentication failed. 
5.2 Omnetpp 
For the network simulation, the Omnetpp network simulator was used. It is an open 
source and generic discrete event simulation environment. It has proven to be useful in 
numerous domains from queuing network simulations to wireless and ad-hoc network 
simulations, from business process simulation to peer-to-peer network, optical switch and 
storage area network simulations. The main advantage of using Omnetpp is that it abstracts 
out the underlying infrastructure and allows us to focus on the main problem. It's based on 
C++ and allows for fine-grained control of the entire system. 
Figure 5.2 Device model in Omnetpp 
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Figure 5.3 Simple network model in Omnetpp 
We model two device categories the sensor which collects the ECG and other 
physiological data and the smart device. Figure 5.2 shows the model of the device. The 
subcomponents in the device model are made for implementation simplicity. Figure 5.3 
shows a simple network model where a device is connected to a smart device. Every 
device type object is linked to a binary file which has the ECG data. The smart device is 
also linked to an ECG data file and can accept multiple input connections and queues the 
messages for processing. 
5.3 Physionet database 
For the simulation of the ECG signals, we will use the ‘mit-bh’ and ‘ecgid’ databases 
from www.physionet.org. PhysioBank hosted within physionet.org is a large and growing 
archive of well-characterized digital recordings of physiological signals and related data 
for use by the biomedical research community. 
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The data from Physionet is stored in a binary format to save space. A C++ wrapper 
was developed with the Omnetpp to extract the files from the binary files. The testing was 
done on ECG collected for 40 different people. Every person has at least two 20 seconds 
recordings. 
5.4 Experiments 
To calculate the accuracy of the system in authenticating the people, two 
experimental configurations were used one to calculate the false acceptance ratio (FAR) 
and false rejection ratio (FRR) and another configuration to calculate the true acceptance 
rate (TAR) and true rejection rate (TRR). The false acceptance ratio is the ratio between 
the number of people who were wrongly identified and the total number of authentication 
requests. FRR or false rejection ratio is the inverse of FAR that is the total number of 
people correctly denied authentication vs. the total number of authentication requests. 
TAR is the measure of people who were authenticated successfully, and TRR is the ratio 
between the number of people incorrectly denied access. 
A good authentication system should have high TAR, FRR, and low TRR and 
FAR. These ratios depend on the threshold value used in the last step of the authentication 
protocol. The following experimental setups are designed to calculate these ratios at 
different threshold values, and the results of the experiment would tell us the accuracy of 
the system. 
36 
Figure 5.4 Network model for testing FAR and FRR 
To measure the FAR and FRR we connect multiple devices to the smart device 
and make sure that none of them are linked to the same ECG file as shown in figure 5.4. 
The TAR and TRR can be tested with a relatively simpler network in which every smart 
device is connected to a device, and both are linked to the same ECG file. Both these 
configurations were tested with the algorithm proposed, and the distributed set intersection 
protocol and the following chapter shows the results. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND RESULTS 
6.1 Simulation Results 
This section presents the results calculated by simulating the fiducial point based 
technique for feature extraction of ECG and the authentication protocol which outputs the 
weighted hamming distance. The results from the simulation of the original Distributed 
Set Intersection Protocol (DSIP) is also presented as a comparison to the proposed 
protocol. 
Figure 6.1 FRR and TAR using DSIP 
Figure 6.1 shows the hamming distance vs. the false negatives on the left and 
hamming distance vs. true positives on the right for six different individuals. The ideal 
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value of the hamming distance would maximize both TAR and FRR, and from the plots, 
we can see that it would be somewhere between 50 and 150 
Figure 6.2 FRR and TAR using modified DSIP 
 As the previous figure, figure 6.2 shows FRR (left) and TAR (right) with weighted 
hamming distance obtained from the modified protocol. This plot indicates an ideal 
threshold value somewhere between 50000 to 300000. 
To calculate both the ideal threshold of the hamming distance and the 
weighted hamming distance we calculate the FRR, FAR, TRR, TAR for all the feature 
vectors from all the 40 individuals. For every individual, we have two records worth 10 
seconds each which means ~160 feature vectors considering a mean of 60 beats per minute 
(BPM) which results in total number of authentications ~20000  
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Figure 6.3 Aggregated plot with hamming distance using DSIP 
Figure 6.4 Aggregated plot with secured hamming distance using the proposed algorithm 
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Figure 6.3 and 6.4 showed the aggregated plots of TAR, TRR, FAR, FRR for 
21832 authentication attempts vs. hamming distance and weighted hamming distance 
respectively. From figure 6.3 the ideal threshold hamming distance is calculated at 106, 
and the accuracy of the protocol using that threshold value is given by: 
Accuracy = 
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠+𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠+𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠+𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠+𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 
Here (𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠)  are the correct results with true 
positives indicating a correct person rightfully granted access and the false negatives 
indicating the wrong person rightfully denied access divided by the all the total results. 
For hamming distance=106, accuracy=91.2% 
Similarly, for the weighted hamming distance case, the ideal threshold is found at 
203200 
For weighted hamming distance=203200, accuracy=99.2% 
This shows the advantage of the modified protocol which has a gain of ~8% in 
accuracy. Now, we check the individual accuracy for the 40 subjects at the calculated 
threshold to see the spread. Ideally, the accuracy for an individual should not vary at all 
otherwise it would mean that the algorithm works only for a certain set of individuals and 
lose generality. The following plots give an idea about the spread of the accuracy using 
both hamming and weighted hamming distance. 
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Figure 6.5 Accuracy vs. person index for DSIP 
Figure 6.6 Accuracy vs. person index for the proposed protocol 
Figure 6.5 and 6.6 showed the spread of the accuracy using the Hamming distance 
from the DSIP and weighted hamming distance from the proposed protocol respectively. 
In figure 6.5, showing the hamming distance approach, the accuracy varies between 0.82-
42 
1.0 and the mean as indicated by the red line at 0.91. For figure 6.6 the accuracy between 
0.95-1.0 with the mean at 0.992. This shows that the results are consistent across 
individuals with irrespective of the protocol being used. 
Figure 6.7 Receiver operating characteristics for DSIP 
Figure 6.8 Receiver operating characteristics for modified DSIP 
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Another plot that shows the accuracy of the system is the Receiver operating 
characteristics curve or the (ROC). The ROC plot was historically used in radar to indicate 
the performance of radar to successfully identify the target object. The ROC plots the 
number of true positives per every false positive at different thresholds. Figure 6.7 shows 
the ROC curves for both the original DSIP protocol and figure 6.8 shows the modified 
DSIP. A straight line (y=x) indicate that the system is essentially guessing and the number 
of false positives = number of true positives. As expected from above the figure shows 
that the modified DSIP offers more accuracy without any extra computational overhead. 
6.2 Conclusion 
The presented work is a complete end-to-end authentication system between the 
bottom and middle tier of the IoT ecosystem particularly wireless body sensor networks. 
All the steps including filtration, feature extraction, and the authentication protocol are 
covered. It shows the potential of using ECG signal for biometric authentication data in 
the context of sensor networks. 
As discussed, the temporal features extracted from the fiducial points provide a 
smaller set of unique features than any non-fiducial point based method. The experiments 
also indicate that the fiducial point based features were more accurate as they had 
relatively high Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) compared to the non-fiducial point based 
method. However, this comes at the cost of computational complexity of detecting the 
fiducial points. Due to the non-stationary nature of ECG using CWT for detecting the 
fiducial point gives robust and accurate results as continuous wavelet transform gives good 
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time resolution and poor frequency resolution at higher frequencies and vice-versa. The 
computational complexity of CWT is 𝑂(𝑛2) , where n is the number of samples being 
processed, it is still manageable in the computationally constrained sensors as n is very 
small. The minimum sampling rate for an ECG is 150 Hz which puts n in the order of 450 
for 3 seconds or 1 cardiac cycle. Moreover, with new developments in the wearable sensor 
space, the sensors are not as resource constrained as they used to be. 
The proposed protocol offers privacy preserving and secure set intersection 
calculation which could be used with ECG features to authenticate. The modification of 
the algorithm has no overhead regarding computational complexity or message 
complexity but improves the accuracy of the system. Also, the algorithm is generic and 
could be used where just the Hamming distance between the set does not provide a good 
measure of the distance between the sets. 
The entire proposed scheme is deployable on a wireless body sensor network with 
an ECG sensor, and any wireless medium with sufficiently low loss rate like Bluetooth, 
Internet Protocol (IP) based like the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), etc. Depending on the type of the application the presented 
scheme could be integrated with other forms of identification methods like an 
accelerometer-based to detect gait etc. to get a multi-modal authentication scheme for 
stronger guarantees. 
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